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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL AWARDS BY 
NATIONAL COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA 
By 
APARNA DEVI JUJJAVARAPU 
(Under the Direction of Professor Gabriel M. Wilner) 
ABSTRACT 
Article V of the New York convention lays down the provisions under which the recognition 
and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused. The United States and India are signatories 
to the Convention. Section 10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act in the United States limits the 
scope of judicial review of the arbitral awards to a clear list of grounds of vacatur. The national 
courts of the United States have recognized several non-statutory grounds of which "manifest 
disregard of the law" as a standard of review is the focus in this thesis. In fact, the state of 
Georgia has also adopted this ground into its statute in 2003. Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act of 1996 lays down the provisions for setting aside arbitral awards of which 
the ground of ‘public policy’ has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of India broadening its 
scope to include ‘patent illegality’ which essentially meant “error of law” as a new ground for 
setting aside an arbitral award. Scope of judicial review by national courts, both in the United 
States and in India, should be limited to the statutory provisions so as to not frustrate the purpose 
of arbitration.  
 
INDEX WORDS: Setting aside, Arbitral awards, New York Convention, Judicial Review,  
   Federal Arbitration Act, public policy, manifest disregard of the law,  
   Unites States, India, Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996,  
   patent illegality, error of law. 
  
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL AWARDS BY 
NATIONAL COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA 
 
By 
 
APARNA DEVI JUJJAVARAPU 
 
 B.A, M.L, University of Madras, India, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
 
 
MASTER OF LAWS 
 
 
 
ATHENS, GEORGIA 
2007 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2007 
APARNA DEVI JUJJAVARAPU 
All Rights Reserved 
  
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL AWARDS BY 
NATIONAL COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA 
By 
APARNA DEVI JUJJAVARAPU 
 
 
 
         
 
        Major Professor: Gabriel M. Wilner 
        Committee: Charles R. T. O’Kelley 
          Gabriel M. Wilner 
 
 
 
Electronic Version Approved: 
Maureen Grasso 
Dean of the Graduate School 
The University of Georgia 
December 2007 
 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER I - International Commercial Arbitration - General Provisions for recognition 
and enforcement of Arbitral Awards.......................................................................................... 1 
Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1 
A.  Advantages of International Arbitration ............................................................................. 3 
B. Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards ............................................................. 3 
C. New York Convention - Article V...................................................................................... 4 
CHAPTER II - Review of Arbitral Awards in the United States - Statutory Provisions ...... 6 
A. Scope of ‘Public Policy” defense under Article V 2(b) of the New York Convention ...... 6 
B. Federal Arbitration Act of the United States – Section 10(a)............................................. 8 
C. Uniform Arbitration Act - Section 23(a) .......................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER III - Review of Arbitral awards in the United States – Non-Statutory Provisions
....................................................................................................................................................... 13 
A.  “Manifest disregard of the Law” as a standard for reviewing arbitral awards ................ 14 
B. Origin of the “manifest disregard of law” as a standard of review................................... 16 
C. The Development of the “manifest disregard of the law” Standard ................................. 19 
D. Elements of “manifest disregard of the law” standard...................................................... 28 
E. “Manifest Disregard of the law” - statutory provision for vacatur in Georgia ................. 34 
F. Implications of the “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard in Georgia ..................... 38 
CHAPTER IV – Review of Arbitral Awards in India – Statutory Provisions...................... 40 
A. International Commercial Arbitration in India – Finality and Enforcement .................... 40 
B. Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ................................................................. 41 
C. Recourse against Arbitral Awards .................................................................................... 42 
  
D. Meaning and scope of “Public Policy” according to the 1996 Act................................... 44 
CHAPTER V - Review of Arbitral Awards in India – Scope Broadened ............................. 48 
A. Scope of Judicial Intervention Broadened ........................................................................ 48 
B. New standard – “Patent Illegality” ................................................................................... 49 
C. Enforcement Proceedings of Foreign Awards. ................................................................. 52 
D. Judicial Intervention on the grounds of error of fact or law ............................................. 53 
E. Standard of Review entailed by the principle of “Competence-Competence”................. 55 
CHAPTER VI - Standards of Judicial Review in the United States and India – 
Observations................................................................................................................................ 59 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 62 
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................... 64 
 1
 
 
CHAPTER I - International Commercial Arbitration - General Provisions for 
recognition and enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
 
 “By and large, parties to international transactions choose to arbitrate eventual disputes 
not because arbitration is simpler than litigation, not because it is cheaper, not because arbitrators 
may have greater relevant expertise than national judges, although any one of those factors 
maybe of interest; they arbitrate simply because neither will suffer its rights and obligations to be 
determined by the courts of the other party’s state of nationality.”1  
Introduction 
 With the explosive globalization of trade and investment, there has been a corresponding 
increase in commercial disputes between parties across national boundaries.2 International 
arbitration is being increasingly sought after as the best mode of alternative dispute resolution in 
such commercial disputes. 
 Arbitration offers a number of advantages over litigation. In fact, even if an agreement to 
arbitrate does not already exist when a dispute arises, the parties may still agree to submit the 
dispute to arbitration for resolution and take advantage of the benefits that arbitration affords.3 
This thesis focuses upon the judicial review of international commercial arbitral awards by 
national courts both in the United States and India in terms of their recognition and enforcement, 
                                                 
1 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS “JUDICIALIZATION” AND UNIFORMITY? 
Introduction at x [Twelfth Sokol Colloquium] (R.Lilich & C.Brower eds., 1993). 
2 Earl McLaren, Effective use of International Commercial Arbitration: A Primer for In-house Counsel, 19 J. INT’L 
ARB. 473, 473 (2002). 
3 Id. at 474. 
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where the courts have gone beyond the statutory scope of review and have attempted to either 
review or set aside arbitral awards on non-statutory standards such as the “manifest disregard of 
the law” in the United States or “error of law” in India. In this thesis, an attempt has been made 
to analyze the judicial decisions by various national courts in the United States and India 
(updated until September 2007) so as to highlight the latest trend in judicial review of arbitral 
awards. The scope of the ‘public policy’ defense employed in the United States for setting aside 
arbitral awards has been first discussed, following which the general trend of the national courts 
going beyond the scope of the statutory grounds in reviewing arbitral awards under the “manifest 
disregard of law” is discussed in detail. The state of Georgia in the Unites States has, in fact, 
adopted this standard of review in its statute in 2003 which has paved the way for courts in 
Georgia to freely interpret the arbitral awards and for parties to seek review under the statute 
itself. This thesis then proceeds to explain the scope of ‘public policy’ laid down in India by its 
Supreme Court initially and the Court’s subsequent review of the ‘public policy’ defense in 
2003, broadening it to include ‘patent illegality’, which essentially meant ‘error of law’ as a 
standard for setting aside arbitral awards. The thesis concludes with a few observations on this 
trend of review by national courts both in the United States and in India while setting out that in 
order to preserve the scope and purpose of arbitration, it is desirable that the national courts 
desist from broadening the scope of judicial review beyond the statutory principles set out in the 
arbitration laws of the respective countries. 
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A.  Advantages of International Arbitration  
 Arbitration can be a superior or an inferior alternative to litigation, depending on the 
circumstances of the case. Some of the advantages most often associated with international 
arbitration are:4 
1) Flexible process;  
2) Neutral forum; 
3) Confidentiality;  
4) Specialized Tribunal;  
5) Finality and Enforcement; and  
6) Cost. 
Though all of the above advantages are self-explanatory, “Finality and Enforcement” is perhaps 
most relevant and is discussed in detail with reference to the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards. 
 
B. Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
 The recognition and enforcement of an award has always been understood to be separate 
from the making of the award itself, the reason being, the award is given by an arbitrator whose 
authority is based on the contract between the parties and who does not possess the authority of 
the State.5 Further, the international treaties that govern the enforcement of an arbitral award, 
such as the New York Convention,6 have much greater acceptance internationally than treaties 
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 V.S Deshpande, Enforcement of Foreign Awards in India, U.K and U.S.A, 4 J. INT’L ARB., 41, 53 (1987). 
6 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V, 7 June 1959,21 U.S.T. 2517, 
330 U.N.T.S. 38, (effective in the United States on December 29,1970) (hereinafter “the New York Convention”). 
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for the reciprocal enforcement of court judgments.7 Indeed, the United States, which is a party to 
the New York Convention, “is not a party to a single treaty providing for enforcement of foreign 
judgments.”8 Article V of the New York Convention lays down the provisions under which the 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused under the Convention, which 
are set out hereunder.  
 
C. New York Convention - Article V 
 1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party 
 against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority, where 
 the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: 
 (a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to 
 them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which 
 the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the 
 country where the award was made; or 
 (b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
 appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to 
 present his case; or 
 (c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms 
 of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of 
 the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to 
 arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which 
 contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or 
                                                 
7 McLaren, supra note 2, at 475. 
8 Id.  
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 (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in 
 accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
 accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or 
 (e) The award has not yet become binding, on the parties, or has been set aside or 
 suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
 that award was made. 
 2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent 
 authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: 
 (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under 
 the law of that country; or 
 (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of 
 that country.9 
                                                 
9 Art V of The New York Convention. 
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CHAPTER II - Review of Arbitral Awards in the United States - Statutory Provisions 
 
Commercial arbitration in the United States has continued to evolve and has continued to 
gain importance as compared to litigation. As the evolution unfolds, several important questions 
have emerged, the answers to which will do much to shape the nature, character, and viability of 
commercial arbitration in the future.10  The most important among these questions is the proper 
standards for judicial review of commercial arbitration awards.  
 
A. Scope of ‘Public Policy” defense under Article V 2(b) of the New York Convention 
Article V(1) contains a list of general defenses to enforcement of arbitral awards. Article 
V(2) contains two additional defenses: the “inarbitrability” defense and “public policy” defense. 
The approach of federal courts in the United States to the arguments made under Article V 2(b) 
that foreign arbitration awards should not be enforced when they violate public policy could be 
understood from the following four Supreme Court decisions, which involve international 
commercial agreements containing forum selection clauses that provided for the resolution of 
disputes in a forum outside the United States.11 
The Supreme Court in 1972 in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.12 upheld a forum 
selection clause in an agreement between an American oil company and a German towing firm. 
                                                 
10 Stephen L.Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards,, 30 GA. 
L.REV. 731, 734 (1996). 
11Andrew M. Campbell, Refusal to Enforce Foreign Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds, 144 A.L.R FED. 
481 (1998).  
12 407 U.S. 1 (1972) 
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Two years later in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,13  the Court again upheld a forum selection 
clause providing for arbitration of disputes. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,14  held that a provision in an agreement 
providing for the arbitration before arbitrators in Japan of disputes arising out of an automobile 
dealership agreement was enforceable, even though it covered anti-trust claims under United 
States laws. The Court concluded that the concerns of international comity, respect for the 
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals and sensitivity to the need of the international 
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes required that it enforces the 
parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic 
context because of the traditional view that anti-trust claims are not subject to arbitration.15 
However, the dissent by Justice Stevens in this case was very strong. He stated that, “vague 
concerns over comity were not to outweigh public policy.”16 He distinguished the Mitsubishi 
Motors case from Scherk as the facts in Mitsubishi Motors did not involve foreign laws and were 
totally under the realm of U.S. antitrust laws.17 He pointed out that Congress did not authorize 
the transfer of decision-making authority of statutory claims from courts to the arbitrators, 18 and 
noted that under the New York Convention, “agreements requiring arbitration of disputes that 
were non-arbitrable under domestic law were not to be honored”.19 The Mitsubishi Motors case 
is a clear example of how the Supreme Court sacrificed public policy in the name of international 
comity. Finally, the Supreme Court in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer,20 in 
an arbitration regarding a bill of lading, stated that any dispute arbitrated in Japan under Japanese 
                                                 
13 417 U.S. 506 (1974) 
14 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 3365 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
17 Id. at 3373. 
18 Id. at 3364. 
19 Id. at 3371. 
20 515 U.S. 528 (1995) 
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law was enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act21 notwithstanding the argument that it 
reduced the liabilities of the carrier in violation of the Carriage of Goods by Seas Act because it 
would be more difficult for the owner of the cargo to sue the shipper in Japan than it would be 
elsewhere. The federal courts have echoed the Supreme Court's emphasis on the importance of 
avoiding a parochial viewpoint in their enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by enforcing them 
despite claims that the arbitration procedures violated United States public policy in various 
ways.22  
Currently, U.S. law does not require commercial arbitrators to set forth their reasons for their 
decision in a written award.23  Earlier, federal courts had continuously held that absence of 
express reasoning by the arbitrators does not warrant vacatur of the arbitral award.24 
Nevertheless, in recent years, particularly since the mid-1980s, there is evidence of an increasing 
willingness by the federal courts to look behind commercial arbitration awards in an effort to 
ascertain whether the arbitral reasoning which lead to that result is so flawed by grave errors of 
law, fact, or contract interpretation as to warrant its vacatur by a reviewing court.25  
 
B. Federal Arbitration Act of the United States – Section 10(a) 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was passed by the Congress in 192526 in the wake of 
agitation and pressure from the business-led reform movement against the costliness and delay of 
                                                 
21 United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 
(2000). 
22 See Campbell, supra note 11. 
23 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 204 n.4 (1956) [(“(A]rbitrators need not disclose the facts 
or reasons behind their award”). 
24 French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 907-08 (9th Cir. 1986). 
25 See Hayford, supra note 10 at 735. 
26 United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 
(2000). 
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litigation.27  While enacting the FAA, Congress recognized the need for finality of arbitration 
awards and therefore limited the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards to a clear list of 
grounds of vacatur.28 Section 10(a) of the FAA sets out the following grounds upon which a 
commercial arbitration award may be vacated: 
 In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the 
 award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party 
 to the arbitration- 
  (1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. 
  (2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them. 
 (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, 
 upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
 controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
 prejudiced. 
 (4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 
 mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 
 (5) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to 
 be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the 
 arbitrators.29   
 
                                                 
27 Brent S. Gilfedder, “A Manifest disregard of Arbitration?” An analysis of recent Georgia legislation adding 
“manifest disregard of the law” to the Georgia Arbitration Code as a statutory ground for vacatur, 39 GA. L REV. 
259, 269 (2004). 
28 Id. 
29 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000). 
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C. Uniform Arbitration Act - Section 23(a) 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the 
Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) in 1955.30 By far the UAA has been one the most successful 
uniform laws to date as over thirty-five states have adopted it in its entirety and fourteen more 
use it as a model for their state arbitration acts.31 The UAA was designed for the same reasons as 
the FAA--to ensure the enforceability and finality of arbitration agreements and to overcome 
state judicial hostility32—and, in fact, the drafters of the UAA used the FAA as a model.33  The 
drafters revised the Uniform Arbitration Act in 200034 in order to deal with the increased use of 
arbitration, greater complexities of underlying arbitration disputes, and intervening changes in 
arbitration law.35  The statutory grounds for vacatur under the revised UAA are found in Section  
23.36 Section 23(a) provides: 
 Upon [motion] to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court shall vacate 
 an award made in the arbitration proceeding if:  
 (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;  
                                                 
30 See Gilfedder, supra note 27, at 269. 
31See generally Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-in" for Judicial Review of Errors of Law under the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 263 (1999) (noting Uniform Arbitration Act is one of most successful 
uniform laws ever and discussing changes made in Revised Uniform Arbitration Act).  
32 Id. 
33 Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing, Revising, and Clarifying Arbitration Law, 
J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2001). 
34 See Unif. Arbitration Act §§ 1-23 (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 2004). 
35 See Heinsz, supra note 33, at 2. The Drafting Committee sought to accomplish three main goals through the 
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA): 1. Because arbitration is at heart a consensual process, the RUAA gives 
party autonomy primary consideration . . . . 2. Many parties choose arbitration because of its relative speed, lower 
cost, and greater efficiency. The RUAA intends to give these factors sufficient weight whenever possible. 3. In most 
cases, parties intend the arbitrators' decisions to be final with little or no court involvement unless there is clear 
unfairness or denial of justice. The RUAA recognizes this contractual nature of arbitration by limiting the grounds 
on which a court may review an arbitrator's award. Id.; see also Unif. Arbitration Act Prefatory Note (amended 
2000), 7 U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 2004) (stating similar goals for revisions to UAA).  
36 Unif. Arbitration Act § 23(a) (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 46 (Supp. 2004). 
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 (2) there was: (A) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; (B) 
 corruption by an arbitrator; or (C) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a 
 party to the arbitration proceeding;  
 (3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for 
 postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise 
 conducted the hearing contrary to Section 15, so as to prejudice substantially the rights of 
 a party to the arbitration proceeding; 
 (4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers;  
 (5) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration 
 proceeding without raising an objection under Section 15(c) not later than the beginning 
 of the arbitration hearing; or 
 (6) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration 
 proceeding as required in Section 9 so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party to 
 the arbitration proceeding. 37 
 In essence the revised UAA focused towards preserving the integrity of the arbitration 
 process by refusing vacatur merely because the "relief [granted by arbitration is] such that 
 it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity."38  
                                                 
37 Id. 
38 See Unif. Arbitration Act, § 12(a), 7 U.L.A. 280-81 (1997); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: 
Defining Arbitration's Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 155-56 (2002) (recognizing 
foregone vacatur options where arbitrator acts on principles of fairness and equity in balancing parties' rights). An 
arbitrator's treatment of substantive law principles is untouched by the UAA just as it is in the FAA.  See Murray S. 
Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 
108 (1997) (reiterating shallow pool for vacatur justification). The UAA implicitly denies recognition to "error of 
law" claims, even those that are egregious. Id. at 110. 
12 
 
When the drafting committee in 1997 assembled to review the UAA and current trends in 
state arbitration, a heated debate surrounded a new proposal that would have provided for 
vacatur if the parties "opted in" for review based on errors of law where a decision substantially 
prejudiced one party.39 A similar conflict arose over the common-law application of the 
"manifest disregard of the law" standard employed by certain courts as a non-statutory basis to 
review arbitral awards.40 Neither proposed provision gained inclusion into the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act (RUAA), leaving arbitration "a desirable alternative to litigation ... [without 
making] arbitration simply another form of litigation."41  
Since the scope of this thesis is the “manifest disregard of the law” under the “non-statutory” 
standards of vacatur of arbitral awards in the United States, analysis under the above statutory 
provisions both under the FAA and RUAA are not discussed here. 
 
 
                                                 
39 See Heinsz, supra note 33, at 27 (recognizing failure to revise UAA to include "opt in" error of law reviewability).  
40 Id. at 30 (mentioning past circuit and state court use of “manifest disregard of the law” non-statutory ground). 
41 See RUAA Drafting Committee, Policy Statement: Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) (May 15, 2000), 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbps0500.htm (expressing committee's desire to keep arbitration process 
efficient, expeditious, economical, fair, and final). The drafters determined that a new "manifest disregard" standard could 
overload the trial courts with arbitration award appeals and that no bright-line test for vacatur existed. Heinsz, supra note 
33, at 34-35 (highlighting lack of clear standard for applying "manifest disregard of the law"). The RUAA does not 
prohibit challenges to arbitrator authority on these grounds; common law dictates if and when these non-statutory 
grounds may be used.   
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CHAPTER III - Review of Arbitral awards in the United States – Non-Statutory 
Provisions 
 
In addition to the four statutory grounds articulated in section 10(a) of the FAA,42 several 
federal circuit courts of appeals have recognized one or more "non-statutory" grounds warranting 
vacatur of an otherwise valid commercial arbitration award. Primary among those non-statutory 
grounds is a "manifest disregard" of the law by the arbitrator, a conflict between the award and a 
clear and well established "public policy," an award that is "arbitrary and capricious"  or 
"completely irrational,"  and a failure of the award to "draw its essence" from the parties' 
contract.43   
Only the Fourth Circuit has unequivocally rejected the non-statutory grounds for vacatur.  In 
Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc.,44  the Fourth Circuit stated:  
 Courts are not free to overturn an arbitral result because they would have reached a 
 different conclusion if presented with the same facts. In the Federal Arbitration Act, 
 Congress has limited the grounds upon which an arbitral award can be vacated, namely, 
 a court may vacate an award [on the basis of the four grounds set forth in section 10(a)]. 
 The statutory grounds for vacatur permit challenges on sufficiently improper conduct in 
                                                 
42  9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). 
43 See Hayford supra note 10 at 739. 
44 32 F. 3d 143 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied115 S. Ct. 903 (1995). 
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 the course of the proceedings; they do not permit rejection of an arbitral award based on 
 disagreement with the particular result the arbitrators reached.45   
The Fourth Circuit case law has thus far followed the clear rule set down in Remmey. 
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit falls to place in the "statutory-grounds-only" category.46 
It is clear that most of the federal circuit courts do not limit their scope of review of 
commercial arbitration awards to a strict reading of section 10(a) of the FAA.47  These courts 
believe that they "retain a very limited power to review commercial arbitration awards outside of 
Section 10"48 under several judicially created, non-statutory grounds for vacatur.  The manner in 
which this judicially created power of review has been exercised by the several circuit courts that 
do not limit themselves to the section 10(a) statutory grounds for vacatur is the subject of 
discussion below. 
 
A. “Manifest disregard of the Law” as a standard for reviewing arbitral awards 
Despite the facial clarity of Section 10(a), all twelve U.S Circuit Courts of Appeals (save the 
Federal Circuit) have embraced one or more non-statutory grounds of vacatur.49 Seminal among 
the non-statutory grounds for vacatur is the “manifest disregard” of the law standard, which was 
derived from the dictum in the United States Supreme Court's 1953 opinion in Wilko v. Swan.50 
Although Section 10 of the FAA51 does not contain the words, “manifest disregard of the law,” 
courts have found that if an award is found to be in manifest disregard of the law, it can be 
                                                 
45  32 F. 3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994). 
46  See Hayford supra note10, at 764. 
47 See Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1994) ("'Federal courts have never 
limited their scope of review [of an arbitration award] to a strict reading of 9 U.S.C. § 10’]” (alterations in original) 
(quoting Jenkins v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1988)). 
48 Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F. 2d. 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). 
49 Stephen L.Hayford, Reining in the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to 
The Law Of Vacatur, J.DISP. RESOL. 117, 118 (1998). 
50 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
51 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). 
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vacated on judicial review.52 The First Circuit observed that, ‘Where a reviewing court is 
inclined to find that arbitrators’ reasoning, if given, would have strained credulity, the absence of 
explanation may reinforce the reviewing court’s confidence that the arbitrators engaged in 
manifest disregard.53  
Thus, courts have vacated awards that show a “manifest disregard of the law,” directly 
conflict with “public policy”, are arbitrary and capricious.54 The federal circuit courts of appeals, 
based on Supreme Court dicta, created the manifest disregard of the law standard.55 While this 
standard has existed for many years, it has been applied infrequently.56 One reason for this 
sporadic use is the difficulty in defining exactly what constitutes a manifest disregard of the law. 
This difficulty is illustrated by the federal U.S. circuit courts of appeals, which have been unable 
to fashion a uniform standard.57 This lack of a clear definition or a clear method of application 
raises serious doubts as to how effective this standard can be in the judicial review of arbitration 
awards58. In addition, what were the judiciary's original reasons for enacting these additional 
grounds for vacatur and whether they contradict the fundamental goals of the arbitration process 
are more questions that arise when considering expanded judicial review of arbitration awards.59 
                                                 
52  See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Management Recruiters Intern., Inc. v. Bloor, 129 F. 3d  851 (6th Cir. 
1997) (stating that manifest disregard for the law, in contrast to misinterpretation, misstatement, or misapplication of 
law, can constitute grounds for vacating an arbitration decision). 
53 PCS 2000 LP v. Romulus Telecommunications, Inc., 148 F. 3d 32 (1st Cir. 1998) 
54 See Stephen L. Hayford & Scott B. Kerrigan, Vacatur: The Non-Statutory Grounds for Judicial Review of 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 51 OCT. DISP. RESOL. J. 22, 26-27 (1996) (discussing different nonstatutory 
grounds for vacatur that federal courts have fashioned). 
55 Id. at 26. 
56 See Hayford, supra note 54 at 29. (noting that as of 1998, there were only two cases where Federal Circuit Courts 
of Appeals had vacated commercial arbitration awards for manifest disregard of law). 
57 See e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that 
manifest disregard of law clearly means more than arbitral error or misunderstanding with respect to law); Halligan 
v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying manifest disregard of law standard when error is 
clearly discernible from record); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461-62 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing manifest disregard standard for first time in Eleventh Circuit and concluding "that a manifest disregard 
for the law, in contrast to a misinterpretation, misstatement or misapplication of the law, can constitute grounds to 
vacate an arbitration decision"). 
58 See Gilfedder, supra note 27 at 261. 
59 Id. 
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B. Origin of the “manifest disregard of law” as a standard of review 
1. Wilko v. Swan 
The manifest disregard of the law standard first originated in the United States Supreme 
Court case of Wilko v. Swan.60This case involved a claim of fraud brought against a securities 
brokerage firm pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933.61 The respondent moved for a stay of trial 
pending the outcome of arbitration that the parties had agreed upon prior to entering into their 
contractual relationship to deal in securities.62 The district court denied the stay, but the second 
court of appeals reversed the judgment.63 The United States Supreme Court’s reasoning 
displayed its traditional hostility toward arbitration.64  
In dicta, the Court stated:  While it may be true that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in 
accordance with the provisions of the Securities Act would "constitute grounds for vacating the 
award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act," that failure would need to be made 
clearly to appear. In unrestricted submissions, such as the present margin agreements envisage, 
the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, 
in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.65  The Supreme Court held that 
parties could not arbitrate issues relating to Securities law because of public policy concerns 
underlying the Securities Act of 1933 and because of the underlying concern about the 
                                                 
60 346 U.S 427 (1953). 
61 Id. at 428 
62 Id. at 429 
63 Id. at 430 
64 See Id. at 435-436. The court stated: This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an 
alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but applied by the arbitrators without judicial 
instruction on the law. As their award may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a complete 
record of their proceedings, the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as 
"burden of proof," "reasonable care" or "material fact." . . . cannot be examined.; see also Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984). 
65 346 U.S. at 436-37 (emphasis added) (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953)). 
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inarbitrability of securities law issues.66 That the Supreme Court's opinion in Wilko v. Swan 67 
has, even after over fifty years, left the federal circuit courts of appeals in a state of confusion 
regarding the grounds on which a commercial arbitration award properly may be vacated is an 
understatement.68   
2. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express  
In 1989, the Supreme Court reversed Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American 
Express.69 The issue in Rodriguez as to “whether a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate claims 
arising under the Securities Act of 1933 is unenforceable, requiring resolution of the claims only 
in a judicial forum"70  centered on the very same question decided by the Court in Wilko. Here, 
the Supreme Court reverser it own precedent of some 36 years in this case by ignoring the rule of 
Wilko that section 12(2) claims under the 1933 Act were not arbitrable.  
The Supreme Court's rejection of Wilko and the "old judicial hostility to arbitration", which 
pervaded its former characterization of the commercial arbitration process, was founded on what 
the Court described as an "erosion" of generally held views over the years,71  as intensified by 
the Court's holdings in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,72  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,73 Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,74 and Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.75 In particular, the Rodriguez Court focused on the 
                                                 
66 Id. at 434-35 
67 Id. at 436, overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
68 Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitral Awards in Federal Courts: Contemplating the Use and 
Utility of the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard”, 27 IND. L.REV. 241, 249 (1993). (discussing the extent 
to which Wilko left lower courts in confusion about proper grounds for vacatur). 
69 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
70 Id. at 478. 
71 Id. at 480-81. 
72 484 U.S. 220 (1987). 
73 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
74 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
75 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
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statement in Mitsubishi that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego 
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits their resolution to an arbitral, rather 
than a judicial forum." 76 The Court then stated emphatically: "to the extent that Wilko rested on 
suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law 
to would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the 
federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."77  
When it reversed Wilko in Rodriguez, the Court did not address the "manifest disregard" of 
the law dictum.78  And in the 56 years since Wilko, the Supreme Court has never clarified the 
meaning and effect it attributes to the "manifest disregard" of the law standard.79 Similarly, the 
Court has never clarified the manner in which the "manifest disregard" construct relates, if at all, 
to the statutory grounds for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards articulated in Section 10(a) 
of the FAA.80 Because a majority of the Supreme Court has never spoken definitively to the 
continued viability of the "manifest disregard" of the law standard in light of Rodriguez, the 
question as to whether the Wilko dictum is still a proper basis for this and all of the other non-
statutory grounds for vacatur remains open.81 Nevertheless, the broad acceptance of the 
                                                 
76 Rodriquez, 490 U.S. at 481(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985)). 
77 Id. at 481-82. 
78The “manifest disregard” standard has been mentioned in Supreme Court opinions only three times since 1953, 
always in dictum, always in passing, twice in dissent. In his dissent in Mitsubishi Motors, Justice Stevens noted, 
without further comment, "arbitration awards are reviewable for manifest disregard of the law." Mitsubishi Motors, 
473 U.S. at 656 (1985). (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his concurring in part opinion in Shearson/American Express v. 
McMahon, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), Justice Blackmun observed: "judicial review is still substantially limited to the four 
grounds listed in § 10 of the [Federal] Arbitration Act and to the concept of 'manifest disregard' of the law." 482 
U.S. 220, 259 (1987). The third reference by the Court to the Wilko manifest disregard dictum is found in a 
parenthetical phrase in the 1995 case, First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
79 See Hayford, supra note 49, at 122. 
80 Id. 
81 Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 684 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Although the holding in Wilko was overruled 
by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the dicta that constitutes the core of appellant's 
argument [relying upon the ‘manifest disregard of the law’ ground for vacatur] was unaffected by the grounds of the 
overruling."). 
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"manifest disregard" of the law ground by the U.S. circuit courts of appeals demonstrates they do 
not question its legitimacy and continued viability.82  
 
C. The Development of the “manifest disregard of the law” Standard  
Most of the circuit courts of appeals have, in one way or other, reviewed arbitral awards 
based on the ‘manifest disregard’ of the law standard. Selected cases of the various circuits, 
showing the development of the “manifest disregard” standard, are discussed below: 
First Circuit  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in Advest v. McCarthy83 that manifest 
disregard of the law entails a showing that the arbitrator "appreciated the existence of a 
governing legal rule but willfully decided not to apply it."84   
Later in Bull H N Information Systems, Inc.,85 the First Circuit confirmed an award, which 
had been vacated by the District Court. With regard to the standards for setting aside awards, the 
Court held: Beyond the specific grounds enumerated in Section 10, courts “retain a very limited 
power to review arbitration awards”. Essentially, arbitration awards are subject to review “where 
an award is contrary to the plain language of the [contract]” and “instances where it is clear from 
the record that the arbitrator recognized the applicable law–and then ignored it”.86 In the parlance 
of this and other circuits, a reviewing court may vacate an arbitration award if it was made in 
“manifest disregard” of the law.87 
                                                 
82 See Hayford, supra note 49 at 122. 
83 914 F. 2d. 6 (1st Cir. 1990). 
84 Id. at 10. 
85 Bull HN Information Systems, Inc., v.Charles J. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321 (1st Cir. 2000). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 331 (quoting Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
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Second Circuit  
Initially the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was consistent with the other 
circuits following Wilko and First Options in Merrill Lynch v. Bobker88 and Willemijn 
Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corporation.89However, in Halligan v. 
Piper Jaffray,90 when considering an appeal from a district court decision that confirmed an 
award that denied relief to the petitioner, the court made an extensive review of the evidence at 
the arbitration hearing. The opinion cited reference to a lower court’s statement that the record 
“does not indicate the Panel’s awareness, prior to its determination, of the standards for burden 
of proof.”91 The Second Circuit, without any other reference to disregard of a specific law, and 
after observing that the Panel made no explanation of its award, concluded: At least in the 
circumstances here, we believe that when a reviewing court is inclined to hold that an arbitration 
panel manifestly disregarded the law, the failure of the arbitrators to explain the award can be 
taken into account. Having done so, we are left with the firm belief that the arbitrators here 
manifestly disregarded the law or the evidence or both.92 In this case, the Second Circuit 
indicated for the first time that the consideration and weighing of the evidence by the Court 
could be factors in determining whether an award should be rejected under the manifest 
disregard standard. 
Finally in Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co.,93 the Second Circuit set forth its own 
two-prong test94 that an arbitrator first must be aware of the well-defined, explicit applicable law 
and then must have ignored it completely.95  
                                                 
88 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986). 
89 103 F.3d (2d Cir. 1997) 
90 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 204. 
93 304 F. 3d. 200 (2nd Cir. 2002). 
94 Id. at 209. 
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Third Circuit  
Although the issue concerned the interpretation of a contract, the Third Circuit in United 
Transportation Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corporation96 recited the following rule: 
“Only when an arbitrator ‘acted in manifest disregard of the law, or if the record before the 
arbitrator reveals no support whatsoever for the arbitrator’s determination,” may a district court 
invade the province of the arbitrator.”97 
Fifth Circuit  
Prior to the decision of First Options v. Kaplan,98 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit had declined to recognize the manifest disregard standard in FAA cases involving 
commercial contract disputes between securities brokers and investors.99 An early Fifth Circuit 
case stated in dictum that judicial review of a commercial arbitration award was limited to 
section 10 and 11 of the FAA.100In fact, it was not until after Wilko and First Options decisions 
that the Fifth Circuit recognized the manifest disregard standard in the 1999 case of Arthur 
H.Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors, Inc.101  
 In our opinion, clear approval of the “manifest disregard” of the law standard in review of 
 arbitration awards under the FAA was signaled by the Supreme Court’s statement in First 
 Options that “parties (are) bound by (an) arbitrator’s decisions not in manifest disregard 
 of the law.”. . . . Accordingly, each of the other numbered federal circuit courts and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
95 Id. (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F. 2d. 930, 934 (2nd Cir. 1986).). 
96 51 F.3d 376 (1995). 
97 Id at 380. 
98 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
99 See generally McIlroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1993); R. M. Perez & Associates, Inc. v. 
Welch, 960 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1992). 
100 Forsythe Int’l, S. A. v. Gibbs Oil Co., 915 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1990). 
101 197 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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 DC circuit have recognized manifest disregard of the law as either an implicit or non-
 statutory ground for vacating under the FAA.102  
After a review of evidence from the manuscript of the arbitration proceedings, the Court 
concluded: “Consequently, we conclude that based on the record presented for our review, it is 
not manifest that the arbitrators acted contrary to the applicable law and that their award should 
be upheld”.103 
Sixth Circuit  
The position of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is clearly set forth in 
Dawahare v. Spencer:104An arbitration decision “must fly in the face of established legal 
precedent” for the court to find manifest disregard of the law. An arbitration panel acts from 
manifest disregard if “(1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to 
reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators refuse to heed that legal principle.”105 Thus, to find 
manifest disregard a court must find two things: the relevant law must be clearly defined and the 
arbitrator must have consciously chosen not to apply it.”106  
Seventh Circuit  
After reviewing the decisions of other circuits, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in Watts v. Tiffany107 stated: “The law in other circuits is similarly confused, doubtless 
because the Supreme Court has been opaque. The dictum in Wilko and First Options was 
unexplained and un-illuminated by any concrete application”.108 The court went on to state its 
                                                 
102 Id. at 760. 
103 Id. at 764. 
104 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000). 
105 Id., see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F. 3d. 418 (6th Cir. 1995). 
106 Id., citing M & C Corp. v. Erwin, 87 F.3d 844, 851 n.3 (6th Cir. 1996).  
107248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001).  
108 Id. at 580. 
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position in regard to manifest disregard of the law, which is substantially different from the 
positions of other circuits:  
 There is, however, a way to understand “manifest disregard of the law” that preserves the 
 established relation between court and arbitrator and resolves the tension in the 
 competing lines of cases. It is this: an arbitrator may not direct the parties to violate the 
 law. In the main, an arbitrator acts as the parties’ agent and as their delegate may do 
 anything the parties may do directly.109 
 In a concurring opinion, Judge Williams agreed with the final decision of her two colleagues in 
that the district court had properly enforced the arbitration award. However, she was critical of 
the majority’s reasoning Court and its pronouncement of what appeared to be a new, or at least 
different, definition of manifest disregard:  
 Because the majority has effectively rejected the manifest disregard doctrine, I will 
 briefly express my concern with that holding. It should be noted that the doctrine of 
 manifest disregard has been substantively uniform in federal courts, requiring that (1) the 
 arbitrator knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignore it 
 altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator was well defined, explicit and clearly 
 applicable to the case. [citing cases] Every court of appeals, including our own, has held 
 that a court may review the decision of an arbitrator for “manifest disregard of the law,” 
 and has adopted, in substance, that very definition. Moreover, the words in the doctrine 
 itself are more in accord with such an interpretation. (Citations omitted.) The majority’s 
 holding conflicts with that precedent, and leaves the doctrine internally inconsistent and 
 effectively impotent.110 
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 580, 581. 
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Eight Circuit  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Homestake Mining Co. v. United 
Steelworkers 111 considered an appeal from the decision of the district court, which overruled a 
motion to vacate an arbitration award. One of the grounds for the motion was that the arbitrator’s 
decision evidenced a manifest disregard for law. The Eighth Circuit’s opinion affirmed the 
district court’s decision and reinstated the arbitral award: “The arbitrator’s interpretation of this 
regulation in plain language is neither “completely irrational [nor] evidences a manifest disregard 
for law,”112 and is therefore “insulated from review.”113 
In Hoffman v. Cargill,114 the Eighth Circuit overruled a decision of the district court that had 
vacated an arbitration award because of the panel’s manifest disregard of the law and because the 
panel’s decision was irrational: 
 We have allowed that “beyond the grounds for vacation provided in the FAA, an award 
 will only be set aside where it is completely irrational or evidence of manifest disregard 
 of the law.” These extra-statutory standards are extremely narrow: An arbitration decision 
 may only be said to be irrational where it fails to draw its essence from the agreement, 
 and an arbitration decision only manifests disregard for the law where the arbitrators 
 clearly identified the applicable, governing law and then proceed to ignore it. We may not 
 set an award aside simply because we might have interpreted the agreement differently or 
 because the arbitrators erred in interpreting the law or in determining the facts.115  
 
 
                                                 
111 153 F.3d 678 (1998). 
112 Lee v. Chica, 993 F.2d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 1993) 
113 153 F. 3d. 678, 681 (1998). 
114 236 F.3d 458 (2001). 
115 Id. at 461-62. 
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Ninth Circuit  
In Barnes v. Logan,116 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed its prior 
holdings in setting forth their standards of review: 
 Judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision “is both limited and highly deferential.”117 An 
 award will not be set aside unless it manifests a complete disregard of the law.118 Thus, 
 an award must be confirmed if the arbitrators, even arguably, construed or applied the 
 contract and acted within the scope of their authority.119 We may affirm the judgment of 
 the District Court on any ground fairly supported by the record.120  
In a subsequent case, Investors Equity Life Insurance Co. of Hawaii, Ltd. v. ADM Investor 
Services, Inc.,121 the Ninth Circuit Court held:” Before the Court can conclude that arbitrators 
acted in ‘manifest disregard’, it must be clear from the record that the arbitrators recognize the 
applicable law and then ignored it.”122  
Tenth Circuit  
Kelley v. Michaels123 was an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit from 
the district court’s ruling that confirmed an arbitration award in a securities law arbitration. One 
of the grounds for the appeal and for setting aside the award was that punitive damages were 
awarded where the parties had agreed in a choice of law provision that any dispute would be 
                                                 
116 122 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 1997). 
117 Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Madison Indus. Inc., 84 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 1996). 
118 Id. 
119 United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1995). 
120 Kruso v. Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989). 
1211997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23881, 22 (1997). 
122Michigan Mutual, 44 F.3d at 832.  See also Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 240 (1st Cir. 
1995) (“there must be some showing in the record, other than the result obtained, that the arbitrators knew the law 
and expressly disregarded it.”). 
123 59 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1995). 
26 
 
governed by New York law, which prohibited the award of punitive damages.124 The uniform 
submission agreement, however, provided for arbitration pursuant to National Association of 
Securities Dealers Inc. (NASD), and the NASD arbitrators’ manual provided for a possible 
award of punitive damages.125  
An identical matter had come before the Supreme Court in Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman.126 The Court in that case stated: 
 . . . [T]the FAA insures that parties’ agreements will be enforced according to their terms 
 even if a rule of state law would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration. In 
 resolving this matter the Supreme Court noted: The best way to harmonize the choice of 
 law provision with the arbitration provisions is to read “the laws of the State of New 
 York” to encompass substantive principles that New York courts would apply, but not to 
 include special rules limiting the authority of arbitrators. Thus, the choice of law 
 provision covers the rights and duties of the parties, while the arbitration clause covers 
 arbitration; neither sentence intrudes upon the other. In contrast, the respondents’ read 
 sets up the two clauses in conflict with one another; one foreclosing punitive 
 damages, the other allowing them. This interpretation is untenable.127  
The Tenth Circuit stated in Kelley v. Michaels, that based on the holding in the Mastrobuono 
it was compelled to find that the arbitration panel did not exceed its authority in awarding the 
Kelleys punitive damages.128 Mastrobuono and Kelley hold that where there are specific conflicts 
between the arbitration clause and the choice of law provisions, full effect shall be given to the 
                                                 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 514 U.S. 52 (1995). 
127 Id. at 63-64.  
128 59 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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arbitration clause where it defines the limits of the authority of arbitrators, notwithstanding a 
conflict with a choice of law provision. 
Eleventh Circuit  
In Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp.,129 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
disposed of an appeal from the district court’s refusal to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The Court 
held that the party alleging the manifest disregard of the law had failed to show that the arbitrator 
in fact acted with such disregard. Arbitration awards will not be reversed due to an erroneous 
interpretation of the law by the arbitrator:.130 “To manifest disregard the law, one must be 
conscious of the law and deliberately ignore it.”131  
District of Columbia Circuit 
In Laprade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc.,132, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit 
considered an appeal from the district court’s decision that had rejected an argument that the 
arbitration panel had acted in manifest disregard of the governing law: 
Manifest disregard of the law “means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the 
law.”133 Consequently, “to modify or vacate an award on this ground, the Court must find (1) 
that the arbitrator knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it 
altogether and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly 
applicable to the case.134 
 
 
                                                 
129 211 F.3d 1217 (2000). 
130 Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc.,128 F.3d 1456, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997). 
131 Id. at 1461. 
132246 F. 3d 702 (2001). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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D. Elements of “manifest disregard of the law” standard 
The case law makes clear that "a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award for ‘manifest 
disregard’ of the law may not proceed by merely objecting to the results of the arbitration."135  
All of the circuit courts have more or less found that "manifest disregard" of the law "clearly 
means more than [an arbitral] error or misunderstanding with respect to the law."136  As a result 
of the Supreme Court's failure to define manifest disregard of the law, the federal appellate 
courts have taken up the role of fleshing out this standard. At first glance, the resulting cases 
seem chaotic; however, at least one commentator has discerned a pattern among the decisions.137  
Professor Stephen Hayford argues that almost all the appellate courts seem to have arrived at a 
consensus that manifest disregard of the law consists of two separate elements.138 First, there is 
an "actus reus" element of the offense.139 The arbitrator must make such a "blatant, gross 
misapplication of law [to the facts such] that it is apparent on the face of the award."140  Second, 
an arbitrator must be aware of the law in the relevant area but nonetheless consciously or 
deliberately disregard the law where an ordinary, reasonable person could discern the applicable 
legal standard.141 This is the "mens rea" element of the defense.142  
Thus, even if a reviewing court finds a blatant misapplication of the relevant law (reflected in 
an arbitral result it believes to conflict with that law), vacatur is warranted under the "manifest 
disregard" of the law ground only if the court is able to conclude that the arbitrator knew, 
correctly interpreted the relevant law, but nevertheless made a conscious, intentional decision to 
                                                 
135 O.R.Sec., Inc. V. Professional Planning Assocs., 857 F. 2d 742, 747 (1st Cir. 1995). 
136 See Merrill Lynch, 808 F.2d at 933 (2nd Cir. 1986). 
137 See Hayford, supra note 49, at 124-125 (Hayford’s model is helpful to understand both the standard as the courts 
now perceive it and the trend in their thinking). 
138 Id. at 124. 
139 Id. at 125. 
140 Id. at 124. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 125.  
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ignore it.143  Both aspects of the "mens rea" requirement must be satisfied—the arbitrator must 
have been aware of the correct law and further must have consciously or intentionally chosen not 
to apply it to the facts of the case in rendering the award.144 
 Despite this consensus, appellate courts have varied widely in their application of this two-
step process, and have responded to these criteria in three general ways.145 These categories do 
not represent three distinct groupings of the manifest disregard of law standard, but rather a 
continuum of deference that the courts give to non-reasoned awards handed down by 
arbitrators.146  
1.  The "Futility Acknowledged" Approach to the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law 
 Analysis 
In this approach, the reviewing courts, in the absence of reasoned awards which is often the 
case in commercial arbitration, attempt to determine the criteria that the arbitrators utilize to 
arrive at their decisions. In this endeavor, the courts often cannot determine if the arbitrators 
willfully disregarded the law.147 The majority of circuit appeals opinions applying the "manifest 
disregard" of the law standard follow this approach. Because this analytical tack never leads to 
vacatur, it reduces the "manifest disregard" of the law ground to a nullity.148 
                                                 
143 M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr & Co., 87 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 1996) (observing that, on the facts of the case 
before it, no "manifest disregard of the law" was shown because "any mistake by the arbitrator in applying [the 
relevant law] was more likely the result of inadvertence, rather than a conscious decision to ignore the relevant law" 
(emphasis added)). 
144 Eljer manufacturing, Inc. v. Kowin Development Corp. 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994). 
145 See Hayford, supra note 49, at 125. 
146 Id. at 125-132. 
147 Id. at 125-26. 
148 Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 240 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[Because the] arbitrators do not explain 
the reasons justifying their award . . .  appellant is hard pressed to satisfy the exacting criteria for invocation of the 
doctrine. In fact, when the arbitrators do not give their reasons, it is nearly impossible for the court to determine 
whether they acted in disregard of the law." (citations omitted)). 
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A reviewing court that requires direct evidence of arbitral knowledge of the correct 
interpretation of the law (the "mens rea" element) will never vacate an award that does not set 
forth the arbitrator's conclusions of law and fails to reveal the manner in which the arbitrator 
applied that law to the facts of the controversy.149  
 2. The "Big Error" Approach to the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law Analysis 
The court, in this approach, focuses only on the ‘actus reus’ element.150 Under this view, the 
key for the petitioner seeking vacatur is convincing a reviewing court that the controlling law is 
so clear and well-settled as to warrant the inference that the arbitrator must have been aware of it. 
So the strategy of the petitioners would be to convince the court that the law is so clear that the 
arbitrator must necessarily have violated the law.151 
Courts that follow this approach assumes that arbitrators have disregarded the law. The 
second circuit in Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV, v. Standard Microsystems Corp. 152 
observed that, "a court may infer that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law if it finds that 
the error [of law] made by the made by the arbitrators is obvious [as measured by whatever 
degree of error standard the particular court has embraced]."153  Under the Standard 
Microsystems formulation of the "manifest disregard" of the law test, vacatur can transpire if the 
court perceives in the award what amounts to a gross error of law that offends its sense of 
justice.154 
 
 
                                                 
149.See Hayford, supra note 49, at 126. 
150 Id. at 127. 
151 Id. 
152 103 F. 3d 9 (2nd Cir. 1997). 
153 Id. 
154 See Hayford, supra note 49 at 127.  
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3. The Presumption-Based Approach to the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law Analysis 
The presumption-based approach gives the least amount of deference to the arbitrator's 
findings of fact and interpretations of law, substituting instead the opinion of the court.155  The 
Eleventh Circuit in Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers156 and the Second Circuit in Halligan 
v. Piper Jaffray Inc. 157 followed this approach, but to date are the only two cases at the federal 
appellate court level that have found that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law.158   
In Halligan, an employee submitted evidence in an employment discrimination arbitration 
claiming that his former employer fired him because he was too old.159 The panel denied 
Halligan any relief and offered no explanation or rationale for the result. 160  The district court 
judge found that  
 The record . . . [did] not indicate the Panel's awareness, prior to its determinations, of the 
 standards for burdens of proof . . . [and that] where [the panel] did not issue a written 
 opinion, [the district court could not] conclude that the panel did in fact disregard the 
 parties' burdens of proof" because it was not the district court's job to reconsider evidence 
 after the arbitral panel had already done so.161  
The appellate court noted that the manifest disregard of the law defense, which Halligan 
raised on appeal, consisted of two elements: "(1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal 
principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether and that (2) the law ignored by the 
                                                 
155 Id. 129-31. 
156 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 -62 (11th Cir. 1997). 
157 148 F. 3d 197 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
158 See Hayford,  supra note 49 at 202, 204.  
159 Halligan, 148 F. 3d at 198. 
160 Id. at 200. 
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arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case."162  In this case the court 
in fact went ahead and evaluated the evidence that the tribunal had considered.163  The court 
noted that the parties' counsel had explained the applicable standards of law to the panel (though 
no evidence showed that the panel actually understood the law) and that Halligan presented 
strong evidence in his favor.164 The court assumed that the panel understood the law and found 
Halligan's strong evidence convincing: "[Combined with] the agreement of the parties that the 
arbitrators were correctly advised of the applicable legal principles, we are inclined to hold that 
they ignored the law or the evidence or both." 165 Additionally, the court determined that the 
arbitrators must have acted in manifest disregard of the law because the panel did not issue a 
written award.166  
In Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros.,167 an employee appealed against the denial of her 
petition to vacate an arbitrator's decision "denying her claim for over-time pay from her former 
employer."168 Specifically, she claimed that her employer's lawyer urged the arbitration panel to 
ignore the relevant law of the Fair Labor Standards Act and to find in favor of the employer.169  
As in Halligan, the court in Montes engaged in a lengthy review of the facts used by the 
arbitration tribunal and determined that manifest disregard of the law consists of two steps -- that 
the arbitrator was "conscious of the law" but "deliberately ignored it." 170  However, the court 
went on to find the following:  
                                                 
162 Id. at 202. 
163 Id. at 204. 
164 Id. at 203-204. 
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167 128 F. 3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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 In the absence of any stated reasons for the decision and in light of the marginal evidence 
 presented to it, we cannot say that this [manifest disregard of the law] is not what the 
 panel did . . . as the arbitrators recognized that they were told to disregard the law (which 
 the record reflects they knew) in a case in which the evidence to support the award was 
 marginal. Thus, there is nothing in the record to refute the suggestion that the law was 
 disregarded. Nor does the record clearly support the award.171  
The court concluded that, since the facts did not support the ruling and since there was no 
presumption in favor of the arbitrator, the arbitrator must have disregarded the law at the urging 
of the employer's counsel.172  
Both of these cases illustrate the essential components of the presumption-based approach.173 
This approach allows the court to work backwards, in that.174  To vacate an unsatisfactory award, 
a court needs to conduct a review of the record, find satisfactory evidence that the arbitrator 
knew the correct law, and assume as a result that he necessarily disregarded the law to arrive at 
such an unjust result 175. 
The court presumes and assumes too many issues in this approach and in fact, attempts to 
conduct and independent review of the evidence, the facts and the law, and tries to match its 
conclusions with that of the arbitral award.176 Hence, in the absence of written opinions for 
awards, the court is often second guessing an arbitrators’ evaluation of the law or fact.177 In 
essence, the courts almost frustrate the entire purpose and process of arbitration in commercial 
matters since the courts end up spending the time that arbitration was designed to save; 
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arbitrators should not have their findings of facts second guessed in the guise of judicial review 
on the law. 
 
E. “Manifest Disregard of the law” - statutory provision for vacatur in Georgia 
In 1988, the Georgia Legislature adopted the current Georgia Arbitration Code.178 This Code, 
based largely on the UAA, replaced the previous common law arbitration procedures codified in 
sections 9-9-1 through 9-9-11.179 Georgia courts have recognized the same fundamental goals of 
arbitration as that of the UAA and the role it plays in the interaction between arbitration awards 
and the judiciary.180 The Georgia Supreme Court has noted that arbitration provisions must be 
strictly construed because they are in derogation of common law.181 The courts of Georgia have 
long recognized that the Georgia Arbitration Code provides the exclusive grounds for vacating 
an arbitration award.182 "The power of a court to vacate an arbitration award has been severely 
limited in order not to frustrate the legislative purpose of avoiding litigation by resorting to 
arbitration."183  Notably, no other state has adopted manifest disregard of the law as a statutory 
ground for vacatur.184 In fact California and New Jersey have expressly rejected manifest 
disregard of the law as a ground of vacatur.185 
                                                 
178.Ga. Code Ann. §§ 9-9-1- -18 (2003). 
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Until recently, the Georgia Arbitration Code's section on vacatur did not differ significantly 
from its federal counterpart.186  However, in the 2003 legislative session, the Georgia Assembly 
passed a law to add the “manifest disregard of the law” standard as another defense to the 
Georgia Arbitration Code's section on vacatur.187  The addition of the “manifest disregard of the 
law” defense was proposed as a consumer protection measure.188  
The amendment was enacted in response to the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in 
Progressive Data Systems, Inc. v. Jefferson Randolph Corp.,189 which reversed a Georgia Court 
of Appeals’ decision that had vacated an arbitration award on the basis of what the Court of 
Appeals found was a manifest disregard of the law.190 The case, however, was not a consumer 
dispute but rather a contract dispute in which, after a two-day arbitration hearing, the arbitrator 
ruled for Progressive Data and awarded compensatory damages of $81,540 plus attorney fees 
and expenses.191 The Georgia Court of Appeals set aside the award holding that the arbitrator had 
confused the applicable damages and thus the award amounted to a "manifest disregard of the 
law."192 The Georgia Supreme Court, however, held that, "in as much as the Code does not list 
'manifest disregard of the law' as a ground for vacating an arbitration award, it cannot be used as 
an additional ground for vacatur."193  Judge Carley, writing for the dissent, noted that, while 
                                                 
186 David Boohaker, Note, The Addition of the "manifest disregard of the law" defense to Georgia's Arbitration Code 
and potential conflicts with Federal law, 21 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 501, 515 (2004). 
187 The only change to the arbitration code proposed by H.B. 91 and eventually adopted by H.B. 792 was the 
addition of a fifth defense: "the arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law." GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13(b)(5) (Supp. 
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188 Representative Mary Margaret Oliver of the Georgia House of Representatives introduced a bill stating that over 
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manifest disregard of the law was not on the list of enumerated defenses, "in the very rare 
instance where an arbitrator intentionally ignores a controlling legal principle, he or she lacks the 
requisite impartiality . . .” and that in such cases, the arbitrator necessarily oversteps the authority 
vested upon him.194 The dissent also tried to qualify the manifest disregard of the law defense by 
noting that it entailed more than just a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the law.195   
The principle of “manifest disregard of the law” was enacted as a statutory defense in 
Georgia in 2003. The provisions of the amended statute are as follows: 
 § 9-9-13.  Vacation of award by court; application; grounds; rehearing; appeal of order:   
 (a) An application to vacate an award shall be made to the court within three months after 
 delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant.  
 (b) The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either participated in the 
 arbitration or was served with a demand for arbitration if the court finds that the rights of 
 that party were prejudiced by:  
  (1) Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award;  
  (2) Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral;   
 (3) An overstepping by the arbitrators of their authority or such imperfect execution of it 
 that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made;  
 (4) A failure to follow the procedure of this part, unless the party applying to vacate the 
 award continued with the arbitration with notice of this failure and without objection; or  
    (5) The arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law. 196   
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Nonetheless, in a recent judgment decided in July 2007 in ABCO Builders, Inc. v. 
Progressive Plumbing, Inc.,197 the Georgia Supreme Court emphatically stated that in the 
absence of any evidence of a specific intent to disregard the appropriate law, an arbitration award 
cannot be vacated under the manifest disregard of the law standard. 198  The court in Progressive 
Plumbing argued, with regard to certain damages awarded to ABCO Builders, Inc. in a 
construction contract dispute that the arbitration panel was presented with the proper legal 
formula to calculate these damages, but it did not employ this formula.199 However, without 
providing any concrete evidence of it, the court, went on to conclude in Progressive Plumbing 
that this erroneous computation could not have been a mistake or misinterpretation, but, instead, 
was an intentional disregard of the law.200  
The Georgia Supreme Court cited to B.L. Harbert Intl. v. Hercules Steel Co., which held that 
"even if we were convinced that we would have decided this contractual dispute differently, that 
would not be nearly enough to set aside the award"201 and Health Services Mgmt. Corp. v. 
Hughes, which stated that "There must be something beyond and different from mere error in 
law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law; it must be 
demonstrated that the majority of arbitrators deliberately disregarded the law in order to reach 
the result they did."202  
                                                 
197 282 Ga. 308 (2007). 
198 O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 (b) (5) (2007).  
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F. Implications of the “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard in Georgia 
Georgia's manifest disregard of the law defense is new and contains no statutory explanation 
of the elements of the defense, leaving the courts to interpret the law.203 Hence the new law only 
creates situations that could severely hamper the finality of arbitration awards and increase costs, 
and provides little benefit to the system of commercial arbitration.204   
Further, the FAA may preempt Georgia's Arbitration Code whenever an arbitration clause is 
at issue in a contract that affects interstate commerce.205 This might lead to a collision between 
principles of the Georgia Arbitration Code and the FAA. The Supreme Court of United States in 
Southland noted that the FAA limited the enforceability of arbitration provisions to contracts 
"evidencing a transaction involving commerce."206 Further the Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson207 held that "involving commerce" was functionally equivalent to 
“affecting commerce,” which in essence implies a very wide meaning to “interstate 
commerce”.208 Hence, to the extent that statutory recognition of manifest disregard of the law 
exists in Georgia as a barrier to enforcement of arbitration awards that are otherwise enforceable 
under federal law, the FAA would preempt Georgia law and nullify the manifest disregard 
defense when the contract in question affects interstate commerce because the defense is 
inconsistent with the broad scope and public policy that FAA envisioned.209   
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In Georgia, the legislature enacted the doctrine to provide protection to consumers from what 
it perceived to be unfair arbitration practices.210 However, the manifest disregard of the law 
doctrine offers little in the way of consumer protection and instead would hamper commercial 
enterprise, a major beneficiary of arbitration in Georgia.211  
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CHAPTER IV – Review of Arbitral Awards in India – Statutory Provisions 
 
A. International Commercial Arbitration in India – Finality and Enforcement 
 
India has always held a deep-rooted commitment to the philosophy of arbitration in general. 
Mahatma Gandhi, in 1927 wrote, “Differences we shall always have but we must settle them all, 
whether religious or other, by arbitration.”212 Foreign arbitral awards have always been treated as 
final on merits in India for the purposes of enforcement with limited or no scope for judicial 
review except strictly under the statute. 213 India became a party to the New York Convention 
with effect from October 11, 1960.214 In order to implement its obligations under this 
Convention, India enacted the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961.215 The 
1961 Act has since been repealed and replaced by the new Indian Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act, 1996.216 The focus of the 1996 Act is the minimization of court intervention in the process 
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.217  
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B. Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 
The Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is a unification statute in the sense that it 
was intended to give effect to multiple international commitments undertaken by India, namely 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985, the New York 
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, the Geneva 
Convention on Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1927 and the Geneva Protocol on 
Arbitration Clauses, 1923.218 
The Act seeks not only to consolidate, but also to unify Indian law both on domestic and 
international arbitration. In other words, under the Act, Indian law would be same for both 
domestic and international arbitrations that take place within the Indian territory219. The 1996 
Act is divided into four parts: Part I is concerned with domestic arbitrations; Part II deals with 
the enforcement of New York Convention awards and European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (“Geneva Convention”) awards; Part III makes legislative provisions for 
conciliation based on the 1980 UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules220; and finally, Part IV adds 
supplementary provisions.221 Chapters one and two of Part II deal with the enforcement of the 
New York and Geneva Conventions awards respectively.222 A foreign award in India is 
enforceable either under the New York Convention,223 the Geneva Convention or under common 
law as applicable in India.224  
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Before the 1996 Act, the Indian Arbitration Act 1940 (which was repealed by the 1996 Act) 
did not make any reference to international arbitrations taking place in Indian territory.225 Since 
the 1940 Act was to be applied to all arbitrations taking place within Indian territory, 
international arbitrations were also ipso facto covered by the enactment.226 The new enactment, 
however, makes a special reference to international commercial arbitrations and has defined the 
same under Section 2(f) of the 1996 Act.  
C. Recourse against Arbitral Awards 
Section 34 under Part I of the 1996 Act lays down the provisions under which applications 
could be filed to set aside arbitral awards. Section 48, Part II of the 1996 Act provides the 
conditions for enforcement of foreign awards. Section 34 and 48 of the 1996 Act essentially 
mirror each other in terms of their provisions, although an application challenging an arbitral 
award is filed under section 34 of the Act.  
In relation to the enforcement of foreign awards, the Indian Supreme Court in Fuerst Day 
Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd.,227 held that there is no need for separate proceedings in order 
to enable the court to decide the enforceability of an award or to make it binding as a order or 
decree and to execute the award. The Supreme Court made the following observations: 
 Part II of the Act relates to enforcement of certain foreign awards. Chapter I of this Part 
 deals with New York Conventions Awards. Section 46 of the Act speaks as to when a 
 foreign award is binding. Section 47 states what evidence the party applying for the 
 enforcement of a foreign award should produce before the Court. Section 48 states 
 the conditions for enforcement of foreign awards. According to Section 49, if the Court is 
                                                                                                                                                             
conscience; if the rule is inequitable or has been abrogated or modified by statute in England, it will not be 
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 satisfied that a foreign award is enforceable under this Chapter, the award shall be 
 deemed to be a decree of that Court and that Court has to proceed further to execute the 
 foreign award as a decree of that Court.  
Specifically, a court hearing an application to set aside an award under the 1996 Act is, on the 
face of the wording of the 1996 Act, precluded from reviewing--even indirectly--the merits of 
the award since setting-aside is no longer possible for errors of law or fact.228 
Section 34 of the 1996 reads as follows:  
 Application for setting aside arbitral award. – 
 (1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for 
 setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and subsection (3). 
 (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court only if- 
 (a) The party making the application furnishes proof that- 
 (i) A party was under some incapacity, or 
 (ii) The arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have 
 subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or 
 (iii) The party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of 
 an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or 
 (iv) The arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the 
 terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the 
 scope of the submission to arbitration: 
 Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from 
 those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on 
 matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or 
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 (v) The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
 accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with 
 a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such 
 agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or 
 (b) The court finds that- 
 (i) The subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the 
 law for the time being in force, or 
 (ii) The arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. 
 Explanation. -Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii), it is hereby declared, 
 for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India 
 if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in 
 violation of section 75 or section 81.229 
 
D. Meaning and scope of “Public Policy” according to the 1996 Act 
The explanatory notes which follow Sections 34(2)(b)(ii) and 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act make 
clear that a party seeking to set aside or resist recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award 
on grounds of public policy faces a very high threshold.230  Essentially, in order to be contrary to 
the public policy of India, the award must rise to the level of having been induced by fraud or 
corruption.231  Furthermore, the explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) also specifies that a violation 
of public policy arises where there is a breach of the confidentiality provisions contained in 
Section 75 of the 1996 Act, or where evidence obtained in conciliation proceedings has been 
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adduced in the arbitration.232 In short, pursuant to the examples specified in the explanatory notes 
included in the 1996 Act, only a serious violation of due process will amount to a violation of 
Indian public policy. 
Thus, the explanatory notes provided in the 1996 Act are clearly in line with the 
interpretation given to the corresponding provisions in the UNCITRAL Model Law.233  Indeed, 
according to the UNCITRAL Model Law Commission Report, the term "public policy" 
comprises: [F]undamental notions and principles of justice. . . .  It was understood that the term 
'public policy,' which was used in the 1958 New York Convention and many other treaties, 
covered fundamental principles of law and justice in substantive as well as procedural respects.  
Thus, instances such as corruption, bribery or fraud and similar serious cases would constitute a 
ground for setting aside.234 
Based on the foregoing, the public policy standard set by the 1996 Act is--consistent with the 
intention underlying the corresponding UNCITRAL Model Law provision--intended to be 
high.235  Accordingly, the 1996 Act provides that only where an award is based on a serious 
violation of due process can the public policy ground be successfully invoked to set aside or 
resist enforcement of such an award. 
As regards the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the Indian Act 
embodies the New York Convention. However one of the main problems that arose in the 
application of the New York Convention was the interpretation of the meaning and scope of 
“public policy” by the National Courts. Indian courts tended to equate the term “public policy” 
with the term “law” as they were conditioned by section 13(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure of 
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India 1908, which provided that a foreign judgment may be refused recognition and enforcement 
in India if it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India.236 The 
repercussions of such an approach are self-evident any foreign arbitral award that is not in 
conformance with the provisions of any of the laws in India could be struck down by adopting 
this view.237 This would mean that hardly any foreign arbitral award could be enforced in 
India.238  
1. Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Company 
 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court of India in Renusagar239 dispelled many of the doubts with 
regard to the scope of “public policy” and clarified the meaning of “public policy” when used in 
enforcement of foreign awards. The Court said the terms should not be equated with the law of 
India: “Something more than the violation of the law of India must be established.” By applying 
this criterion, the enforcement of foreign awards would be refused, if such enforcement would be 
contrary to:  
(i) the fundamental policy of Indian law; or 
(ii) the interests of India; or 
(iii)justice or morality240. 
This decision set an extremely high standard for Indian courts to refuse to enforce a foreign 
arbitral award. 
The Supreme Court of India has recognized that international arbitral awards are enforceable 
internationally, and therefore should be international in their validity and effect.241 The Supreme 
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Court, in Renusagar,242 recognized the pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention, and 
thus held that a court in India should restrict itself to the grounds outlined in Section 48 of the 
Act. Those grounds, moreover, do not enablea party to challenge an arbitral award on its 
merits.243 The Supreme Court also endorsed the view that foreign awards must be more liberally 
enforced.244 The Court held that mere violation of a law would not lead to the conclusion that 
“public policy” has been infringed.245  
The High Court of Delhi recognized in Ludwig Wunsche & Co. v. Raunaq International 
Ltd.246 that under Section 7 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 
(the implementation legislation of the 1958 New York Convention), the “Court has no power to 
set aside the award, the Court can only refuse enforcement of the award.”247 The provisions of 
the New York Convention have greatly influenced the UNCITRAL Model law, and since the 
1996 Act has adopted the Model law, there is no reason why Indian courts will not apply this 
reasoning to awards under the new Act.248 
                                                                                                                                                             
241 Brace Transport Corp. of Monrovia, Bermuda v. Orient Middle East Lines Ltd., A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1715, 1720. 
242 A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 860. 
243 Id. at 881 
244 The Supreme Court cited with approval several U.S decisions e.g., Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler 
Plymouth Inc. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985). 
245 Id. 
246 (1989) 2 Arb.L. R.122.   
247 Id. at 136, para 26. 
248 See Ramasamy, supra note 221, at 466. 
 
48 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V - Review of Arbitral Awards in India – Scope Broadened 
 
A. Scope of Judicial Intervention Broadened 
The efficacy of any legislation must be judged by its implementation rather than its 
intentions.249 Unfortunately, in practice, the Indian courts have vastly enlarged the scope of 
challenge of awards to much more than what is available under the 1996 Act. 
1. Oil & Natural Gas Corp. Ltd. v. SAW Pipes Ltd. 
In this case, the Supreme Court of India adopted a broad interpretation of the term “public 
policy” by essentially including “error of law” as a new ground for setting aside an arbitral 
award. 250  This “error of law” ground was not provided for under the 1996 Act. The Court then 
effectively used this new ground as a basis to review the merits of the case. While the Saw Pipes 
decision is, at first glance, only relevant to proceedings to set aside awards with seat of 
arbitration in India, the ramifications of this decision may potentially extend to recognition and 
enforcement proceedings of foreign awards in India.251   
The Supreme Court of India's decision in the SAW Pipes case concerned an arbitral award 
rendered in a dispute between two domestic parties in India.  SAW Pipes Ltd. ("SAW Pipes"), 
the respondent in the case before the Supreme Court, had agreed to supply Oil and Natural Gas 
Corp. Ltd. ("ONGC"), the appellant, with casing pipes for offshore oil exploration.252 The 
contract between SAW Pipes and ONGC provided that a delay to the contractually agreed date 
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for the supply of the pipes would entitle ONGC to a stipulated amount as liquidated damages.253 
SAW Pipes delivered the pipes late, claiming force majeure based on strikes, and sought a time 
extension.254 ONGC denied this request and claimed liquidated damages for the late delivery of 
the pipes.255 SAW Pipes disputed this application of liquidated damages and the matter was 
referred to the Arbitral Tribunal. 
In its award, the Arbitral Tribunal held that although the strikes did not fall within the 
contractual definition of force majeure, ONGC was not entitled to liquidated damages for the 
delay since it had failed to establish that it had suffered any loss as a result of the late delivery.256 
Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal held that ONGC had wrongfully applied for liquidated 
damages.257 ONGC sought to set aside the arbitral award before the Indian courts on grounds of 
public policy pursuant to section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the 1996 Act. 
The Supreme Court set aside the award on the basis that the Arbitral Tribunal had erred when 
it concluded that ONGC must prove the loss it suffered in order to seek liquidated damages.258  It 
held that, as a matter of contractual interpretation and statutory law, the appellant was not 
required to prove its loss and, therefore, was entitled to liquidated damages.259 
 
B. New standard – “Patent Illegality”  
The Supreme Court of India has also introduced a new ground for setting aside an award 
called “patent illegality”. The basis for the same has been explained as follows: "In our view, 
reading section 34 conjointly with other provisions of the 1996 Act, it appears that the legislative 
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intent could not be that if the award is in contravention of the provisions of the 1996 Act, still 
however, it couldn't be set aside by the Court."260 
The Court then analyzed whether the award could be set-aside on public policy grounds.  The 
Court regarded the standard of public policy laid down in Renusagar261 as "narrow" meaning of 
public policy and held in Saw Pipes as follows: 
 . . . [I]in a case where the judgment . . . is challenged before the . . . court exercising 
 revisional jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of such court would be wider.  Therefore, in a case 
 where the validity of award is challenged, there is no necessity of giving a narrower 
 meaning to the term 'public policy of India.' On the contrary, wider meaning is required 
 to be given so that the 'patently illegal award' passed by the Arbitral Tribunal could be 
 set aside.262 
Thus, the Supreme Court lowered the threshold of the public policy ground for setting-aside 
arbitral awards.  It ruled that, certainly in cases of set-aside proceedings in India, an award can be 
set aside on public policy grounds, not only if the award is contrary to one of the three public 
policy grounds enumerated in Renusagar, but also if it is "patently illegal."263 
The question that therefore arises is: What exactly did the Court mean when it stated that an 
award would also be contrary to public policy if it were “patently illegal”? Close scrutiny of the 
SAW Pipes Decision shows that the Indian Supreme Court employed a substantially different 
meaning of the term "patent illegality" than had been generally accepted and used in the public 
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policy case law developed in international arbitration.264First, the Court stated that there is no 
definition of "public policy" for the purposes of Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the 1996 Act: 
 The phrase 'Public Policy of India' is not defined under the 1996 Act.  Hence, the said 
 term is required to be given meaning in context and also considering the purpose of the 
 section and scheme of the 1996 Act. . . .  Hence, the concept 'public policy' is considered 
 to be vague, susceptible to narrow or wider meaning depending upon the context in 
 which it is used.265 
Second, since the Court concluded that there was no definition of public policy at hand, it 
decided that--in apparent disregard of the high threshold for public policy provided for in the 
explanatory note to Section 34(2)(b)(ii)--it would adopt a broader meaning of "public policy."266  
Finally, the Court set forth its definition of "patent illegality." It held that an award was 
"patently illegal" if the Arbitral Tribunal had committed an error of law.267 By interpreting the 
concept of "public policy" to include "error of law," the Supreme Court went beyond the scope 
of the 1996 Act.268  Indeed, the 1996 Act did not mention error of law as a ground for setting 
aside an award based on public policy. 
In short, the Supreme Court effectively used the public policy ground as means to conduct a 
review of the merits of the case and to "substitute its own view for the view taken by the 
Arbitrators. . ."269 The Court's interpretation of public policy is so broad that it potentially opens 
the floodgates to more and more challenges of arbitral awards before the Indian courts.270 
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C. Enforcement Proceedings of Foreign Awards.  
While the Saw Pipes Decision was rendered in the context of an Indian award, and therefore 
arguably does not apply to the recognition and enforcement proceedings for foreign awards 
pursuant to Section 48 of the 1996 Act, the Court did not specifically exclude foreign awards 
from its reasoning.271  Since the provisions on public policy with regard to the setting aside and 
the recognition and enforcement of awards in Sections 48(2)(b) and 34(2)(b)(ii) essentially 
mirror each other, it is uncertain whether the Court will in the future apply its broad 
interpretation of public policy to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, i.e., awards rendered 
outside India. 
This uncertainty is further compounded by the Supreme Court's decision of 2001 in Bhatia 
International v. Bulk Trading SA & Another.272 In this case, the Court ruled that Part I of the 
1996 Act, which includes Section 34 on set-aside proceedings, would also apply to foreign 
awards unless impliedly or expressly excluded by the parties. Specifically, the Court stated: 
 To conclude we hold that the provisions of part I would apply to all arbitrations and to all 
 proceedings relating thereto. Where such arbitration is held in India, the provisions of 
 part I would compulsory [sic] apply. . . .  In cases of international commercial arbitrations 
 held out of India, provisions of part I would apply unless the parties by agreement, 
 express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. In that case, the laws or rules 
 chosen by the parties would prevail.  Any provision, in part I, which is contrary to or 
 excluded by that law or rules will not apply.273 
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The Bhatia decision has been the subject of much debate as it reversed the established 
understanding that Part I of the 1996 Act would not apply to arbitrations with a seat outside of 
India.274 Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that in the future, an ill-considered decision could 
construe the reasoning in the Saw Pipes case--which, of course, arose in the context of a set-aside 
proceeding under Part I--to also somehow apply to recognition and enforcement proceedings 
under Section 48 contained in Part II of the 1996 Act. 
 
D. Judicial Intervention on the grounds of error of fact or law 
 
The 1996 Act was brought into existence mainly to achieve, among other objectives, the 
minimization of the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process and to provide that every 
final arbitral award is enforced in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court.275 
Courts in India have given varied opinions from time to time as regards judicial intervention 
and review of arbitral awards. The courts have held that, “as the parties choose their own 
arbitrator, they cannot, when the award is good on the face of it, object to the decision either on 
law or on facts and the award will neither be remitted nor set aside.’”276 The mere fact that the 
arbitrators have erred in law or facts can be no ground for interference by the court and the award 
will be binding on the parties.277 
However, courts have not been always consistent in their views with regard to reviewing of 
arbitral awards. The Supreme Court, in one case, observed, “when an arbitrator instead of giving 
effect to the statutory formula contained in the contract, coined one of his own which he thought 
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was just and reasonable, the arbitrator committed jurisdictional error and the award could not be 
sustained.”278 
The court should not substitute its own reasons for that of the arbitrator as long as the 
arbitrator’s reasons do not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record or that is 
otherwise unreasonable and based on surmises and conjectures.279 In Maharashtra State 
Electricity Board v. Sterlite Industries (India),280 the Supreme Court stated that, “An error in law 
on the face of the award means, that you can find in the award or document actually incorporated 
thereto, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, 
some legal propositions which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is 
erroneous.”281  
On the issue of error of law and error of fact patent on the face of the award, which may be 
grounds to set aside an award, the Supreme Court in the Saw Pipes282 case, relied upon .Arosan 
Enterprises Limited v. Union of India.283  There, the Court stated,  
 Where the error of finding of fact having a bearing on the award is patent and is easily 
 demonstrable without the necessity of carefully weighing the various possible view 
 points, the interference in the award based on erroneous finding of fact is permissible and 
 similarly, if an award is based by applying a principle of law which is patently erroneous, 
 and but for such erroneous application of legal principle, the award could not have been 
 made, such award is liable to be set aside by holding that there has been a legal 
 misconduct on the part of the arbitrator.284 
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In a recent decision in Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v Friends Coal Carbonization,285 the Supreme 
Court again set aside the portion of the arbitral award, which was opposed to the specific terms 
of the contract. The Court, relying on Saw Pipes, observed that it is open to the court to consider 
whether the award is against the specific terms of contract and if so, whether to interfere with it 
on the ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the public policy of India.286 However, the 
proper approach of the courts in matters relating to setting aside of arbitral awards is limited and 
is expressly stated in the 1996 Act.287 
 
E. Standard of Review entailed by the principle of “Competence-Competence” 
A strict interpretation of “Competence-Competence” would dictate that courts limit 
themselves to establishing the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement, and the  arbitral 
tribunals be left to substantively rule their own jurisdiction.288 Though this principle does not 
deal with the finality and enforcement of arbitral awards, it certainly involves the issue of court 
intervention and judicial review in the arbitral process. Besides, there is a counterargument that, 
rather than courts intervening with the awards when they are later challenged for lack of 
jurisdiction, parties are better off if courts definitively ruled on the existence and validity of the 
arbitration agreements at the outset.289 The recent Indian Supreme Court decisions on this 
principle raise more questions than they answer, but do at least give cause for optimism that in 
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grappling with the standard of review entailed by Competence-Competence, Indian courts are 
inching towards a less interventionist, pro-arbitration stance.290   
In Shin-etsu Chemicals Co. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd.,291 the question before the Indian Supreme 
Court was whether Section 45 of the 1996 Act,292 which incorporated Article II(3) of the New 
York Convention,293 required a prima facie or a final review by the national courts when faced 
with a challenge to the validity and existence of an arbitration agreement.294 The Supreme Court 
held by a 2-1 majority that, when considering a challenge to the existence or validity of an 
arbitration agreement, "the court is required to take only a prima facie view for making the 
reference to arbitration, leaving the parties to a full trial either before the Arbitral Tribunal or 
before the court at the post-award stage."295  Shin-etsu was hailed as a progressive and pro-
arbitration judgment.296  
Less than three months after Shin-etsu, the Supreme Court in SBP & Co. v. Patel 
Engineering297  permitted further court intervention in the arbitral process. The case concerned 
the appointment of an arbitrator by the chief justice of the Supreme Court in circumstances 
where the parties’ chosen method for constituting the tribunal had failed.298 The issue was 
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referred to a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court for a definitive ruling, and the court by a 
majority of 6-1 held that the Chief Justice, while discharging this function, is entitled to 
adjudicate on contentious preliminary issues such as the existence of a valid arbitration 
agreement.299 It rejected the argument that the chief justice’s role be limited to a prima facie 
review of the facts while making such a determination and instead held that the chief justice was 
entitled to call for evidence to resolve jurisdictional issues.300  
Significantly, the Supreme Court ruled that the Chief Justice’s findings on these preliminary 
issues would be final and binding on the arbitral tribunal.301 This makes a mockery of the well-
established principle of Competence-Competence—the power of an arbitral tribunal to determine 
its own jurisdiction—as enshrined in section 16 of the 1996 Act. It also encourages parties to 
sabotage the appointment process of arbitrators, to make spurious arguments about preliminary 
issues, and to use evidentiary hearings in courts to delay arbitral proceedings.302  
Almost fifteen months after Patel Engineering, the Supreme Court was again faced with the 
issue of whether a dispute existed between the parties that must to be referred to arbitration in 
Agri Gold Exims Ltd. v. Sri Lakshmi Knits and Wovens. 303 Although the Court did not discuss 
Shin-etsu or Patel Engineering, the limited standards of review, which it applied in determining 
the arbitrability of a dispute, made it significant for the purposes of Competence-Competence. 
The Supreme Court held that where there an arbitration agreement exists, an Indian court is 
obligated under Section 8 of the 1996 Act304 to refer the parties to arbitration.305 The Court's 
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approach in Agri Gold is consistent with Shin-etsu in championing a pro-arbitration attitude 
involving minimal interference by courts in the arbitral process.  Agri Gold is a step in the right 
direction as it shows an inclination on the part of Indian courts to respect arbitration clauses and 
hold parties to their bargain by referring them to arbitration.   
On their face, the legislative provisions regarding the set-aside and recognition and 
enforcement of awards contained in the 1996 Act are promising and are in line with international 
standards.306  However, decisions such as Saw Pipes and SBP Patel are changing the standard of 
review to be applied by the Courts, which seriously calls into question the independence of 
arbitral awards from judicial review on the merits.307 
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CHAPTER VI - Standards of Judicial Review in the United States and India – 
Observations 
 
Both India and the United States are common law countries and signatories to the New York 
Convention. As to the potential for a review of an award on merits by the Indian judiciary, it has 
to stated that though India has not effectively recognized many non-statutory standards for 
reviewing arbitral awards, Indian courts have been inconsistent in their approach in setting-aside 
of the arbitral awards under the 1996 Act. This is a cause for concern since it is precisely this 
independence from the courts which is imperative for achieving some of the key goals of 
arbitration, namely speed and efficiency.308   
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2003, was introduced before the Indian 
Parliament in December 2003 and it aims to add a Section allowing an award to be set-aside 
“where there is an error apparent on the face of the arbitration award giving rise to a substantial 
question of law”.309 This bill is envisioned to apply to domestic awards.310 The Parliament is now 
effectively trying to provide an additional ground of challenge under Clause 27 of the 
Amendment Bill to provide that where the award is not an international award in India, the 
parties can challenge it award on the additional ground that there is an error apparent on the face 
of the award that gives rise to a substantial question of law.311In terms of the uncertainty caused 
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by the Supreme Court's introduction of error of law as a new ground for setting aside an award, 
as mentioned above, the December 2003 bill specifically sets forth "error of law" as a ground for 
setting aside a domestic award.312  This bill is currently before the Parliament of India.313  While 
it may--if passed--put to rest this uncertainty, it will potentially open the door wide for the courts 
to revisit otherwise final arbitral awards on the merits.314 
In the United States, the Second Circuit court in Toys “R” Us found that a non-domestic 
award made in the United States would be subject to vacatur ‘in accordance with its domestic 
arbitration law and its full panoply of express and implied grounds for relief’ including “manifest 
disregard of the law”.315 The United States remains a victim of a self-inflicted competitive 
disadvantage imposed by its single legal framework for arbitration.316 The adaptation of 
“manifest disregard of the law” as a standard of review under the Georgia law in its statute has 
only further expanded the general trend of court intervention in review of arbitral awards often 
involving second guessing the interpretations of the arbitrators in their awards. The spillover of 
domestic precedents into international cases will inevitably chill the selection of U.S cities for 
arbitration, as foreign parties understandably hope to avoid excessive judicial interference.317 
The never-ending debate over ‘manifest disregard of the law’, as well as the constant evolution 
of judicially crafted grounds for setting aside arbitration awards, indicate that the time has 
probably come to reform the FAA.318 The FAA should be amended to provide a separate 
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framework for international arbitration that would restrict default rules limiting judicial review of 
awards to only the narrowest grounds.319  
The Eleventh Circuit, in an attempt to quell an appeal of arbitration brought under the 
”manifest disregard of law” in B.L. Harbert International v. Hercules Steel Co., warned counsel 
that they would be sanctioned for frivolous challenges to arbitration awards.320 The court stated: 
This Court is exasperated by those who attempt to salvage arbitration losses through 
litigation that has no sound basis in the law applicable to arbitration awards. The warning this 
opinion provides is that in order to further the purposes of the FAA and to protect arbitration as a 
remedy we are ready, willing, and able to consider imposing sanctions in appropriate cases.321 
Some legal scholars even suggest that arbitral institutions should create a mechanism for 
appeal so as to avoid judicial intervention and excessive review by the courts.322 As Professor 
Thomas Klitgaard remarked, speed and finality are virtues, but only if you win. They are not 
virtues if a fundamental mistake has been made.323 
However, on a more optimistic note, at the end of the day, the United States non-statutory 
“manifest disregard of the law” test establishes an extremely high hurdle for those seeking to 
apply it to avoid liability for an arbitration award.324 It is difficult to imagine an international 
arbitrator writing an award in which he or she painstakingly sets out an applicable legal principle 
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and then defiantly ignores it or states that he or she will not apply it. It is hard to argue that such 
an arbitrator would not deserve to see the award set aside or not enforced.  
 
Conclusion 
Judicial review of the merits of arbitral awards by national courts whether in the United 
States or India, clearly runs the risk of impinging upon arbitration as an effective method of 
dispute resolution.  The trend has been such that the, parties to an arbitration agreement can no 
longer be confident that an arbitral award, once rendered, is final.325  If disputes are anyway 
going to end up in courts, there is very less incentive for parties to arbitrate in the first instance. 
In sum, it is clear that judicial standards of review, like judicial precedents, are not the 
property of private litigants. 326 That said, federal appellate courts must continue to develop 
predictable precedents involving statutory grounds for judicial review.327 They also should take a 
more uniform approach to the manifest disregard doctrine.328 When they do so, parties and their 
counsel may be able to recognize the likelihood of success on appeal of most arbitration 
awards.329Arbitration's goals are unquestionably best served by ensuring the finality of 
arbitration awards.330 This is consistent with the bargain the parties have made, and the remedy 
for any flaws in the system of arbitration should be for having the parties to choose better 
arbitrators, not to appeal arbitration awards.331However on a positive note, at least one 
commentator has argued that the frequency of judicial review of awards has not sapped 
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arbitration of its efficiency.332 The system works despite pervasive motions and appeals because 
non-reviewability is relatively inconsequential to arbitration's efficiency.333 
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